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This paper assesses whether the international monetary system is already tri-
polar and centred around the US dollar, the euro and the Chinese renminbi 
(RMB). It focuses on what we call China’s “dominance hypothesis”, i.e. 
whether the renminbi is already the dominant currency in Asia, exerting a large 
influence on exchange rate and monetary policies in the region, a direct 
reference to the old “German dominance hypothesis” which ascribed to the 
German mark a dominant role in Europe in the 1980s-1990s. Using a global 
factor model of exchange rates and a complementary event study, we find 
evidence that the RMB has become a key driver of currency movements in 
emerging Asia since the mid-2000s, and even more so since the global financial 
crisis. These results are consistent with China’s dominance hypothesis and with 
the view that the international monetary system is already tri-polar. However, 
we also find that China’s currency movements are to some extent affected by 
those in the rest of Asia.  
 
 
JEL No: F30, F31, F33, N20 
 
Keywords: International monetary system, exchange rates, tri-polarity, China, 









The 2007-08 global financial crisis has brought the reform of the international 
monetary system back to the forefront of the international policy debate. Some G20 
Leaders, notably from emerging economies, are questioning the configuration of the 
current system, which is based on a single currency, the US dollar, as the global 
reference currency, and the euro, as a more regional currency. Not only was the 
United States the origin of the financial crisis, and Europe the first continent to be 
engulfed in subsequent sovereign debt crises, but many link the global financial crisis 
to the dominant role of the US dollar, to the “exorbitant privilege” it gives to the 
United States, to the lack of policy discipline it encourages, and to the negative 
externalities it creates for the global economy. 
 
A move to a multi-polar international monetary system is deemed by many as 
a distant prospect, but others expect it to unfold over the next two decades as a natural 
outcome of the emergence of Asia as the world economy’s powerhouse. Over those 
years, as the story goes, the Chinese renminbi (RMB) may emerge as a truly global 
currency, along with the euro, while the US dollar may lose its dominant status. It is 
therefore unsurprising that the reform of the international monetary system has 
become one of the main priorities of the G20’s policy agenda, with some of its 
members pushing actively for the emergence of a more “diversified” international 
monetary system that would give a greater role to the RMB or to the Special Drawing 
Right (SDR). 
 
This paper assesses to what extent a tri-polar international monetary system –
including the US dollar, the euro and the RMB– has already emerged along with the 
implications of this emergence for the global economy and international financial 
markets. In so doing, the paper focuses on what we call “China’s dominance 
hypothesis”, i.e. whether the RMB is already the dominant currency in Asia, exerting 
a large influence on exchange rate and monetary policies in the region, as much as 
China exerts a large influence on its neighbours through the well-known Asian 
production chain or Asian supply chain. Our focus on this hypothesis is rooted in the 
fact that there is, somewhat paradoxically, a strong sense of déja vu in today’s debate 
on the future of the international monetary system. This debate is remarkably 
reminiscent of a much older one, which took place in Europe in the 1980s-90s, about 
the so-called “German dominance hypothesis”.  
 
We test China’s dominance hypothesis by following two complementary 
empirical approaches. In a first step, we carry out an unconditional analysis based on 
a three-factor model of exchange rates, comprising a US dollar factor, a euro factor 
and a regional currency factor for a set of 48 currencies of advanced and emerging 
economies. Through the evolution of the regional FX factor, we test whether other 
neighbouring currencies have grown in importance in driving domestic exchange rate 
changes over time, and whether the regional factor has become particularly important 
in emerging Asia.  6
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Overall, we find evidence in line with China’s dominance hypothesis, albeit 
with some qualifications, which suggests that the international monetary system is 
already on the verge of being tri-polar. We identify a statistically significant regional 
FX factor in emerging Asia’s exchange rate dynamics, stronger than in any other 
regions of the world, a factor that has risen markedly in magnitude since China started 
its exchange rate reforms in 2005. Moreover, this Asian regional FX factor is found to 
be mainly driven by the RMB. There is, however, also evidence that causality is to 
some extent bi-directional and that the movements in Asia’s regional factor also partly 
steer those of the renminbi.  
 
As a second approach, an event-study analyses how specific shocks to China’s 
FX regime impacts exchange rates within Asia as well as globally. The results 
confirm those of the unconditional analysis in that the RMB and other Asian 
currencies react quite similarly to such shocks, while currencies elsewhere respond 
very differently from the RMB. This is fully consistent with the finding of the 
unconditional analysis, which showed that the RMB factor loading within Asia is 
substantial, implying that other Asian currencies closely co-move with the RMB. The 
second finding is that currencies in the rest of the world do respond strongly to shocks 
to China’s FX regime. It is in particular advanced country currencies, and foremost 
the euro and currencies managed vis-à-vis the euro, which are influenced by changes 
to the RMB regime.  
 
The findings of the paper raise a number of questions. One of these issues 
concerns the optimality of FX configurations in Asia and whether the fact that 
countries focus their FX management vis-à-vis a currency from outside the region, 
such as the US dollar, is optimal or whether stronger explicit exchange rate 
coordination at the regional level might be beneficial. This is indeed what Europe’s 
experience iQ the 1980s and 1990s would suggest. As China continues to reform its 
exchange rate regime in the years ahead, it is well possible toR that such a question 
could be of increasingly pressing policy interest, both for Asia and globally. 
 7
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The 2007-08 global financial crisis has brought the reform of the international 
monetary system back to the forefront of the international policy debate. Some G20 
Leaders, notably from emerging economies, are questioning the configuration of the 
current system, which is based on a single currency, the US dollar, as the global 
reference currency, and the euro, as a more regional currency.
1 Not only was the 
United States the origin of the financial crisis, and Europe the first continent to be 
engulfed in subsequent sovereign debt crises, but many link the global financial crisis 
to the dominant role of the US dollar, to the “exorbitant privilege” it gives to the 
United States (see e.g. Gourinchas and Rey, 2007a and 2007b; Curcuru, Dvorak and 
Warnock, 2008), to the lack of policy discipline it encourages, and to the negative 
externalities it creates for the global economy. 
 
A move to a multi-polar international monetary system is deemed by many as 
a distant prospect (Dobson and Masson, 2009; Cheung, Ma and McCauley, 2010; 
Kenen, 2011), but others expect it to unfold over the next two decades as a natural 
outcome of the emergence of Asia as the world economy’s powerhouse (see e.g. 
Eichengreen, 2009 and 2010; Angeloni et al. 2011). Over those years, as the story 
goes, the Chinese renminbi (RMB) may emerge as a truly global currency, along with 
the euro, while the US dollar may lose its dominant status. It is therefore unsurprising 
that the reform of the international monetary system has become one of the main 
priorities of the G20’s policy agenda, with some of its members pushing actively for 
the emergence of a more “diversified” international monetary system (Zhou, 2009; 
BRIC, 2010) that would give a greater role to the RMB or to the Special Drawing 
Right (SDR). 
 
This paper assesses to what extent a tri-polar international monetary system –
including the US dollar, the euro and the RMB– has already emerged along with the 
implications of this emergence for the global economy and international financial 
markets. In so doing, the paper focuses on what we call “China’s dominance 
hypothesis”, i.e. whether the RMB is already the dominant currency in Asia, exerting 
a large influence on exchange rate and monetary policies in the region, as much as 
China exerts a large influence on its neighbours through the well-known Asian 
production chain or Asian supply chain.
2  
 
Our focus on this hypothesis is rooted in the fact that there is, somewhat 
paradoxically, a strong sense of déja vu in today’s debate on the future of the 
international monetary system. This debate is remarkably reminiscent of a much older 
one, which took place in Europe in the 1980s-90s, about the so-called “German 
dominance hypothesis”. The parallels that can be drawn between discussions at that 
time and current ones are indeed striking. 
                                                 
1 The euro’s international role, notably as a reserve or anchoring currency, is indeed most evident in the 
euro area’s neighbouring regions; yet the euro has also global outreach in some respects, in bonds and 
FX markets, for instance (see ECB, 2011). 
2 See e.g. Feenstra and Wei (2009), Koopman, Wang and Wei (2008) or Hummels, Ishii and Yi (2001). 8
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The international monetary system was back then already dominated by the 
US dollar. De jure, the European currencies were all linked to each other under the 
European Monetary System (EMS), through a network of bilateral pegs vis-à-vis each 
other and in reference to the ECU (a weighted average of the participating currencies) 
at fixed, but adjustable, exchange rates agreed jointly. De facto, the system was 
markedly asymmetric (Giavazzi et al. 1986), with Germany’s Deutsche Mark playing 
a dominant role, and other European currencies shadowing the German currency.
3 The 
proponents of the “German dominance hypothesis” (e.g. Giavazzi and Giovannini, 
1987; Giavazzi and Pagano, 1988; Gros and Thygesen, 1988; Russo and Tullio, 1988; 
von Hagen and Frattianni, 1990) saw this as a rather coercive arrangement, which 
forced the other members to follow the disciplinary, low-inflation monetary policy of 
the Bundesbank. Allegedly, reducing Germany’s dominance through a sharing of its 
monetary supremacy was, in the view of several European countries, a prime 
motivation to create the euro (Marsh, 2009).
4 
 
Empirical tests of this hypothesis produced somewhat more nuanced results, 
however (e.g. de Grauwe, 1989; Cohen and Wyplosz, 1989; von Hagen and 
Frattianni, 1990; Frattianni and von Hagen, 1990). A result of many studies was that 
Germany’s effect on other EMS countries was stronger, rather than the reverse effects 
on Germany. These countries’ monetary and exchange rate policies were therefore 
affected  both  by Germany and some of the EMS countries themselves, while 
Germany’s monetary and exchange rate policy remained independent. Strictly 
speaking, this rather points to a special role of Germany within the EMS than to its 
dominance per se. Typically, these studies used money market interest rates or money 
growth data as well as parameter restriction tests implied by the German dominance 
hypothesis and/or Granger causality tests to assess whether German interest rates or 
money growth led interest rates and money growth elsewhere in Europe (see e.g. von 
Hagen and Frattianni, 1990).
5 
 
There are important similarities with Asia’s situation today. De jure, emerging 
Asian economies peg their currencies to the US dollar, like Europeans did to the 
Deutsche Mark, in what has been coined a “Revised Bretton Woods system” (Dooley, 
Folkerts-Landau and Garber, 2004) or an “East Asian dollar standard” (McKinnon 
and Schnabl, 2004). De facto, Asian economies are tightly dependant on China, by far 
                                                 
3 The 1992-93 EMS crises, which forced Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK out of the system, 
made these asymmetries particularly apparent when Germany –hit by the unification shock– tightened 
monetary policy while the rest of Europe was still in recession. This episode paved the way for the 
creation of the euro by the end of the decade. 
4 For instance, Marsh (2009, p.113) notes that “in the second half of the 1980s France realised it needed 
political as well as technical measures to restrain Germany’s monetary predominance”, which led to 
early thinking about creating a single currency. He further quotes (p. 115) the late President Mitterrand 
as saying in 1988 that “Germany has recovered its economic power but refuses to share it”.  
5 Some of the subsequent literature uses different techniques to gauge asymmetries in the ERM, such as 
non-linear forecasts when performing causality tests, with broadly similar results (e.g. Bajo-Rubio et al. 
2001, Reade and Volz 2011). 9
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the region’s largest economy, as European economies were on Germany.
6 There are 
ongoing plans to strengthen monetary and financial cooperation within Asia, such as 
through the Chiang Mai Initiative, a regional network of currency swaps to be 
activated in times of crisis. The mesh of real and financial linkages woven under the 
Asian production chain encourages Asian economies to maintain their external 
competitiveness relative to China and currency stability relative to the RMB. In turn, 
this suggests that China’s exchange rate and monetary policy, together with the 
reform measures taken since mid-2005 to increase exchange rate flexibility and the 
international role of the RMB, is likely to exert a significant –if not dominant– 
influence on exchange rate and monetary policies elsewhere in emerging Asia. 
 
By no means does this necessarily imply that the RMB’s influence in the 
region is or will be stronger than that of the US dollar. For instance, for Europe in the 
1980s, it was found that while German interest rate movements had the strongest 
effect on interest rates of all countries in the continent, US interest rates had also 
retained a significant effect. The concept of a country’s dominance is a relative one, 
and it can still exist alongside that of another country that also exerts strong influence. 
This may be the case of the RMB indeed. While it may not dominate the US dollar’s 
impact on Asian economies, it may nevertheless exert a large and rapidly growing 
impact on the region. 
 
As noticeable as the parallels between Europe yesterday and Asia today may 
be, the China dominance hypothesis cannot be tested in a similar fashion as the 
German dominance hypothesis. Among the most commonly used indicators to 
measure a currency’s international role are the amount of currency in circulation 
outside the issuing country, the denomination of financial assets in that currency, its 
use in trade transactions or share in FX reserves (see e.g. ECB 2011). However, the 
non-convertibility of the RMB and its rigid exchange rate regime make none of these 
indicators informative. Importantly, we stress that the aim of our analysis is not about 
understanding the international role of the RMB in all its dimensions.
7 Our goal is 
rather to focus on its role as an anchoring currency and to gauge how strong the 
influence of China’s FX policy is on other countries’ FX and monetary policies, 
especially within the region– hence the analogy to the German dominance hypothesis. 
 
More specifically, we need to take into account an identification challenge that 
arises from the RMB’s de facto peg to the US dollar (or, to be more precise, snail-
paced crawling peg between mid-2005 and mid-2008, as well as since mid-2010). 
                                                 
6 Both China today and Germany twenty years ago (i.e. at the time of the European Monetary System) 
are (were) the largest economies in their region and a hub for regional trade. China’s share in emerging 
Asia’s output is about double that of Germany in the European Economic Community’s output two 
decades ago (at around 50% vs. 25%; see Chart C1). Both China today and Germany two decades ago 
are sizeable trading partners for their neighbours, accounting each for 10-20% of their bilateral trade 
(see Charts C2 and C3). 
7 In fact, since June 2010 Chinese authorities have undertaken several policy reforms to ultimately 
foster also such an international role of the RMB, such as the creation of an RMB offshore markets in 
Hong Kong (with additional plans to create one in London unveiled in September 2011), allowing the 
issuance of RMB bonds and transactions through banks, as well as a trade settlement scheme to provide 
incentives for some foreign trading partners to settle in RMB. 10
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1392
October 2011
 
Moreover, short-term interest rate or money aggregate co-movements, which were 
used in the German dominance hypothesis literature, are unlikely to be very 
informative about China’s influence on the rest of Asia. China’s money, credit and 
other financial markets remain heavily regulated, segmented or repressed. The 
People’s Bank of China relies still largely on administrative measures and reserve 
requirements, aside from price-based measures. China’s capital account remains 
largely closed, suggesting that domestic monetary and financial conditions do not 
cross borders easily. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, as for most emerging 
markets which exhibit a fear of floating, China’s main monetary policy tool is the 
anchoring of its currency: monetary policy is the exchange rate policy (Calvo and 
Reinhart, 2002). 
 
To overcome these challenges, we test China’s dominance hypothesis by 
following two complementary empirical approaches. In a first step, we carry out an 
unconditional analysis based on a three-factor model of exchange rates, comprising a 
US dollar factor, a euro factor and a regional currency factor for a set of 48 currencies 
of advanced and emerging economies. Through the evolution of the regional FX 
factor, we test whether other regional currencies have grown in importance in driving 
domestic exchange rate changes over time, and whether the regional factor has 
become particularly important in emerging Asia. We then link the regional factor in 
Asia to movements in the renminbi by means of Granger causality tests. In a second 
step, we conduct a conditional analysis based on shock-augmented factor model. In 
this analysis, we investigate the FX market reaction to official statements by Chinese 
authorities on exchange rate and reserve policy to identify the impact of these 
statements on global exchange rate constellations, while still controlling for the three 
FX factors of the first approach. The key strength of this complementary approach is 
that it allows for a clean identification of specific and exogenous RMB shocks and to 
measure how they affect exchange rates in the rest of Asia and beyond. 
 
Overall, we find evidence in line with China’s dominance hypothesis, albeit 
with some qualifications, which suggests that the international monetary system is 
already on the verge of being tri-polar. We identify a statistically significant regional 
FX factor in emerging Asia’s exchange rate dynamics, stronger than in any other 
regions of the world, a factor that has risen markedly in magnitude since China started 
its exchange rate reforms in 2005. Moreover, this Asian regional FX factor is found to 
be mainly driven by the RMB. There is, however, also evidence that causality is to 
some extent bi-directional and that the movements in Asia’s regional factor also partly 
steer those of the renminbi. China’s impact on other emerging Asian countries’ 
exchange rate policy is therefore increasingly strong and significant, but the region, 
taken together, still has an impact on China’s exchange rate policy. Strictly speaking, 
this points to an important role of China in the region, but not to exclusive dominance 
per se. 
 
The complementary event-study analyses how specific shocks to China’s FX 
regime impacts exchange rates within Asia as well as globally. Two key findings 
stand out. First, the results confirm those of the unconditional analysis in that the 11
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RMB and other Asian currencies react quite similarly to such shocks, while currencies 
elsewhere respond very differently from the RMB. This is fully consistent with the 
finding of the unconditional analysis, which showed that the RMB factor loading 




The second finding is that currencies in the rest of the world do respond 
strongly to shocks to China’s FX regime. It is in particular advanced country 
currencies, and foremost the euro and currencies managed vis-à-vis the euro, which 
are influenced by changes to the RMB regime. This finding is consistent with an 
earlier study (Fratzscher and Mehl 2009) –which focused however on the US dollar, 
euro and yen only– that had shown that expectations of a weakening of the RMB peg 
to the US dollar trigger a rebalancing of portfolios into other reserve currencies, such 
as the euro. As a consequence, the largest effect of those statements is found for 
currencies that rely on the euro as an anchor, possibly due to market expectations of 
diversification of China’s reserves out of the US dollar into the euro, along with that 
of a possibly declining dominance of the US currency in the international monetary 
system.  
 
Alongside the literature on the future of the international monetary system and 
on the “German dominance hypothesis”, our paper is also linked to a nascent 
literature on the role of the renminbi as an anchor currency in Asia. Chen et al. (2009) 
and Ito (2010) apply the standard Frankel-Wei methodology (Frankel and Wei, 1994 
and 2008) to find evidence that the renminbi plays a role in other East Asian 
currencies’ de facto baskets since 2005, although the weight of the US dollar in this 
basket remains by far the largest. Chow (2011), by contrast, finds no evidence for 
such an RMB role. 
 
  The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents our estimation 
methodology and hypotheses. Section 3 reviews the empirical results. Section 4 
concludes and draws policy implications. 
 
 
                                                 
8 As a point of clarification, there is a fine but important distinction between whether policy-makers 
with managed exchange rate regimes allow markets to move their currencies in response to RMB 
policy announcements, or whether they actively pursue such movements. A case in point for the latter 
is the announcement by Malaysian authorities within days of China’s RMB policy change in 2005 to 
appreciate the ringgit, explaining this decision by China’s FX move. 12
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2. Estimation and hypotheses 
 
This section describes the empirical methodology underlying the two complementary 
approaches, as well as outlines the data sources and construction. 
 
2.1 Unconditional analysis 
 
The starting point of our analysis is a three-factor global model of foreign exchange 
returns, in the spirit of the methodology proposed by Frankel and Wei (1994 and 
2008). The three factors include a US dollar factor, a euro factor (i.e. the two main 
currencies of the international monetary system) as well as a regional currency factor. 
In its most general specification, the model is written as 
 
 












t i i t i s s s s , , , , , , , ε β β β α + + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + = ∆ t i, X δ   (1) 
 
 
where si,t is the log of the exchange rate of country i vis-à-vis the SDR at time t; X a 
vector of control variables; the αi country fixed effects; the various βs and δs 
(country- and time-varying) parameters; ε  the n.i.d. residuals; and where the 
superscripts  USD,  EUR and  REG denote the US dollar, euro and regional FX factors, 
respectively. As is common in the literature using the Frankel-Wei methodology, we 
use exchange rates vis-à-vis the SDR in order to be able to estimate the importance of 
the US dollar for local currencies i. In extensions to this benchmark specification, we 
will also use bilateral US dollar exchange rates, which allows gauging the economic 
magnitude of the effects of movements in the regional FX factor. 
 
Our dataset includes daily exchange rate data for 48 advanced and emerging 
economies over the period 1 January 1997 (i.e. just before the Asian crisis) to 28 
January 2011 (see the full list of countries in Table 1). We source the data from 
Bloomberg and use exchange rate quotes as available at 16:00 p.m. GMT (i.e. the 
London fixing time, a standard industry benchmark; see Melvin and Prins, 2010). We 
use 2-day non-overlapping exchange rate returns to account for the fact that trading 
zones in Asia and the Pacific, Europe and the Western Hemisphere do not overlap 
(see e.g. Ehrmann, Fratzscher and Rigobon, forthcoming) and to avoid creating 





The regional factor is constructed as a GDP-weighted average of the 
currencies of a particular region, excluding country i itself to ensure that it is not on 
                                                 
9 Using 2-day returns makes no meaningful difference for the estimation of the factor model for 
exchange rates, as all currency values are taking at the same time, i.e. 16:00 p.m. GMT, i.e. London 
fixing time. However, in the robustness checks for other asset markets, such as short-term interest rates, 
which are available only at local closing times, the issue of non-overlapping trading times becomes 
relevant. 13
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10 We group countries in six regions: advanced economies (the 
G10 floating and most liquid currencies, as well as Denmark and Iceland), emerging 
Asia, Latin America, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), emerging Europe, and 
Middle-East and Northern Africa (MENA, see Table 1 for more details).
11 
 
To ensure that the factors are exogenous and to allow for their interpretability, 
we apply the following three identification conditions: we consider the US factor as 
exogenous, reflecting the US dollar’s dominant role in the international monetary 
system; we orthogonalize the euro factor with respect to the US dollar factor by 
regressing the former on the latter and taking the residuals as the euro factor; and we 
orthogonalize the regional factor with respect to both the US and euro factors. This 
latter condition is especially important when considering emerging Asia, where most 
countries manage their currencies vis-à-vis the US dollar, as we want to make sure to 
identify movements in the region’s currencies that are not solely due to US dollar 










t s s s , ⊥ . Figure 1 and Figure 
2 show the US factor, the euro factor as well as the regional factor (for each of our six 





Table 2 reports pair-wise correlations between the three factors prior to 
orthogonalization, when pooling all the data for the regional factor as well as broken 
down by region. The rather low correlations (below 0.2 in absolute terms), and even 
negative one between the US and euro factors suggest that, even after 
orthogonalization, a significant share of euro factor-related and regional factor-related 
information remains to explain global FX configuration dynamics. There is some 
heterogeneity across regions, however. For instance, the US dollar factor is much 
more correlated with Asia and the GCC’s regional factors (in the order of 0.5-0.7), in 
line with the US dollar pegs prevalent in many countries of these regions. The euro 
factor is strongly correlated with the advanced economies’ regional factor (which 
likely reflects the inclusion of Iceland, Sweden and Denmark in the region, which all 
manage their currency heavily relative to the euro). 
 
                                                 
10 Strictly speaking, we would therefore need to denote the regional return  i REG
t i s
\
,  but we use the 
shortcut for notational ease. We prefer to use fixed weights (calculated as full sample period averages) 
rather than time-varying ones to ensure that the factor loading estimates reflect only currency 
movements and not changes in weights. 
11 Our regional groupings draw from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO) classification. Our 
group of “advanced economies” include those economies in our sample deemed by the WEO to be also 
advanced economies. Our “emerging Asia” group includes the WEO’s newly industrialised Asian 
economies and those belonging to developing Asia according to the WEO; our “Latin America” group 
those belonging to “Latin America and the Caribbean” in the WEO; our “emerging Europe” group 
those that are classified by the WEO into “Central and Eastern Europe” as well as into the 
“Commonwealth of Independent States”; last, we have singled out from our “Middle-East and Northern 
Africa” group (akin to the WEO’s own group) the Gulf Co-operation Countries because of their strict 
US dollar pegs. 14
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  Our test of China’s dominance hypothesis relies on two nested hypotheses. We 
first test for the existence of a regional FX factor in emerging Asia and whether it has 
grown in economic importance after the onset of China’s exchange rate reforms in 








i H H 2005 2005 0 0 ˆ ˆ :    and    0 ˆ : ≤ > ≤ ′ = β β β   (1bis)
 
 
for  i  ∈ emerging Asia. Second, and conditional on this, we test whether Asia’s 
regional factor (excluding the renminbi) is driven by movements in the renminbi and 







+ ∆ + ∆ = ∆
+ ∆ + ∆ = ∆
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
= − = −





































for REG ∈ emerging Asia and lag order n, we use a standard F-test to test the two 
following null hypotheses 
 
 




1 0 = = = ′ ′ ′ = = = ′ ′ n n H H β β ρ ρ   (1ter)
 
 
2.2 Conditional analysis 
 
The three-factor model of equation (1), on which the tests of China’s dominance 
hypothesis presented so far are based, is informative about co-movements and 
correlations across global foreign exchange returns. However, such a model is mute 
about the ultimate source of these co-movements, which can be identified only 
indirectly. A more direct way to test for China’s dominance hypothesis is therefore to 
analyze the transmission of specific shocks to China’s FX regime, which can be 
clearly identified. This allows identifying the direction of causality and the origin of 
co-movements with the added advantage to more cleanly trace the effect of a 
particular shock through global foreign exchange markets. 
 
We therefore conduct a complementary analysis based on a shock-augmented 
factor model. The aim is to carry out an event-study to exploit the global FX market 
reaction to official statements made by Chinese authorities on exchange rate and 
reserve policy so as to identify their exchange rate impact, in particular for emerging 
Asian currencies. The key strength of this approach (see also Fratzscher, 2008a, 
2008b, 2009; Fratzscher and Mehl, 2009) is that it allows for a clean identification of 
specific and exogenous RMB shocks and to measure how they affect the rest of Asia. 
Our hypothesis is that if market participants consider such statements as credible, they 15
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can be expected to have a depreciating effect on the US dollar against the euro and 
against currencies that use the US dollar as an anchor, like those of emerging Asia.
12 
 
This prior is based on the following motivation. Chinese official statements 
pointing to a diversification of reserves out of US dollars or to the desirability of an 
appreciation of the RMB against the US dollar should weaken the US dollar against 
other major currencies primarily through a portfolio balance channel. This would 
imply indeed that China reduces its purchases of US dollar-denominated securities 
and, in turn, its demand for US dollars. This channel has been shown to have played 
some role in the past for foreign exchange market intervention by central banks (see 
e.g. Branson, 1977; Dominguez and Frankel, 1993). The effect of official statements 
may also occur through a coordination channel (Sarno and Taylor, 2001) as they may 
trigger and help coordinate expectations among market participants. In particular, 
statements interpreted by markets as suggesting a weakening of the strong US dollar 
focus of China’s exchange rate policy might be interpreted as a signal that relative 
demand for global currencies could fundamentally change and, in particular, that the 
role of the US dollar in the international monetary system could decline. 
 
Dollar-pegged currencies in emerging Asia should also appreciate relative to 
the US dollar for two related reasons. First, market participants might interpret official 
statements as a signal that, should China decouple from the US dollar, the rest of Asia 
could well de-couple too. Second, official statements that point to an appreciation of 
the RMB against the US dollar encourage other emerging Asia economies to let their 
currencies appreciate in turn, to stabilise their relative competitiveness within the 
Asian production chain. 
 
Our conditional model is an extended version of the model we use for the 
unconditional analysis, i.e.  
 
 














t i i t i s s s IO s , , , , , , , , ε β β β β α + + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + + = ∆ t i, X δ   (2) 
 
where we have added IO, a [-1; 0; +1] indicator variable for Chinese statements on the 
exchange rate regime or reserves. Appendix B provides a theoretical basis for such a 
model, based on the microstructure literature of FX markets, and more specifically the 
literature on announcement effects and asset prices (e.g. Andersen et al. 2003, Blinder 
et al. 2008). 
 
                                                 
12 Our earlier research suggests that statements of Chinese authorities should be taken seriously indeed. 
In a previous paper (Fratzscher and Mehl, 2009), which had focused on their impact on the US dollar, 
euro and yen, we had found that, on average, statements by emerging market authorities lead to an 
appreciation of 0.25% of the euro against the US dollar and of 0.15% of the yen against the US dollar 
on the day they occur. This is in fact fairly large: about half the estimated average impact of the ECB 
President’s exchange rate statements on the USD/EUR (see also Fratzscher, 2008a); and about the 
same estimated average impact of Japan's Minister of Finance’s statements on the JPY/USD. 16
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  Our test of China’s dominance hypothesis consists in testing whether the 
official statements lead to an appreciation of emerging Asian currencies which is 
similar to the RMB response itself, i.e. policy-makers in other Asian economies are 
willing to let their currencies move in response to such shocks, but only to the extent 
that their own currencies remain relatively stable – or do not appreciate overly fast–
against the RMB: 
 





i H β β   (2bis)
 
for  i  ∈ emerging Asia. Note that our prior is to have a negative sign on the 
coefficient, which implies an appreciation response, as the currency is defined as 
LC/SDR. An open issue is whether and how other, non-Asian currencies may respond 
to such statements about China’s FX regime. If markets expect that a change to the 
RMB regime may imply e.g. a significant diversification of reserves out of the US 
dollar, it may well be that the euro and other reserve currencies –and currencies co-
moving with these reserve currencies– are relatively more sensitive to such statements 
than the RMB or other Asian currencies. This is the main hypothesis of interest in the 
empirical section presented below. 
  
Data on Chinese statements 
 
In order to take the model to the data, we compile a novel database of 
statements of official statements by Chinese authorities on exchange rate and reserve 
policy, which builds partly on the database used in Fratzscher and Mehl (2009). We 
collect statements by the People’s Bank of China (PBC) Governor, People’s Republic 
President and Premier as well as by other PBC officials, including the Head of the 
State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) and other Chinese officials who 
have occasionally –albeit more rarely– expressed public views on the renminbi and/or 
on the composition of China’s reserves.
13 A list of those policy-makers is provided in 
Table I in Appendix A. 
 
Public statements generally stem from three sources: speeches, interviews and 
public testimonies. In order to ensure that these statements were also available to 
market participants in financial markets, one of the most commonly used wire 
services, Reuters News, was chosen to extract relevant news releases for the period 1 
January 1997 to 28 January 2011. These releases were obtained through Factiva. 
Reuters News has the advantage of being one of the most comprehensive wire 
services, reporting on and disseminating all major news in a timely and truly global 
fashion, usually within a short timeframe after a public announcement. It is also 
among those providers which receive greatest attention among traders and investors 
                                                 
13 For instance, these include officials from Chinese Investment Corporation, the institution which –
along with SAFE– is in charge of managing China’s reserve assets. 17
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In selecting the statements, the search criteria for those relating to China’s 
exchange rate policy were: 
 
(a) the name or the title of the policy-maker, 
(b) the word “exchange rate” or “renminbi”  or “RMB” or “yuan” and 
(c) the words “stable” or “stability” or “flexible” or “flexibility” or “dollar” or 
“peg”. 
 
Likewise, the search criteria for statements on China’s reserve policy were: 
 
(i) the name or the title of the policy-maker, 
(ii) the word “reserves” and 
(iii) the words “composition” or “diversification” or “portfolio” or 
“rebalancing” or “dollar”. 
 
Clearly, a crucial issue is how to classify the statements in terms of both 
content and meaning. Statements IO are categorised as advocating that the US dollar 
peg will be relaxed either to let the RMB appreciate or depreciate or that the peg will 
be maintained. Moreover, statements referring to reserve allocation are classified as 
either suggesting diversification away from the US dollar, diversification into the US 
dollar or that the composition of reserves remains unchanged: 
 
US dollar peg relaxed to appreciate 
Diversification out of the US dollar 
US dollar peg maintained 















t IO  
US dollar peg relaxed to depreciate 
Diversification into the US dollar 
 
Table II in Appendix A contains examples of statements for each of those 
categories. The classification is a judgmental one and clearly in some cases difficult to 
make. Three points should be noted. First, the classification is done in a mechanical 
way, i.e. all statements are classified based on their language content, and by at least 
                                                 
14 Arguably an alternative might be to use intraday data together with the time stamps corresponding to 
the statements of our database. However, using intraday data is not a feasible option for improving our 
identification scheme because the reports of Reuters News are the articles summarising a particular 
statement by a policy-maker. These articles may come as soon as 20 minutes after a particular 
statement, or they become available several hours later in the day. Hence we cannot measure the high-
frequency market response of a statement because no data is available for the initial “snaps” (i.e. real-
time reporting of headlines containing at most a few words), which may occur within seconds after a 
statement. 18
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two persons. Second, the only statements that are not classified and left out are those 
that occurred on release days of relevant macroeconomic data or monetary policy 
meeting days, which could have a dominant effect on those days. Third, the advantage 
of using newswire services is that an interpretation of the statements is very often 
provided by professionals who are aware of nuances and experienced in interpreting 
them. 
 
Two additional caveats should yet be borne in mind. A first caveat is that 
newswire reports may not reflect the true intention of policy-makers. Moreover, some 
public statements may not be covered hence the list of statements is only a list of 
statements as reported by Reuters, and not necessarily a complete one. This is a 
relatively minor drawback, however. As the objective of our conditional analysis is to 
analyse the reaction of market participants to policy-makers’ communication, it seems 
sensible indeed to focus only on those statement that actually become available to 
market participants and, again, Reuters News is among those providers that receive 
greatest attention among traders and investors. 
 
Table III in Appendix A provides a summary of the around 320 statements we 
collected for the period 1 January 1997 to 28 January 2011. The bulk of these 
statements (269, or about 80%) are on the exchange rate regime. In terms of meaning 
and content, about 60% of the statements repeat a mantra that the exchange rate 
regime will remain unchanged and are classified as neutral; about 30% are classified 
as signalling that the reference to the US dollar will be relaxed to let the RMB 
appreciate; about 10% are classified as signalling that the reference might be relaxed 
to let the RMB depreciate (e.g. when uncertainties mounted in the wake of the Asian 
crisis as to whether the Chinese renminbi might be devalued). Statements on reserve 
policy reserve are fewer (about 50) than those on exchange rate flexibility. More than 
half thereof signal diversification away from the US dollar. In terms of authorship, 
about 40% of the statements were made by the Governor of the People’s Bank of 
China and 20% by the Chinese Premier, while the President of the People’s Republic 




To further give an intuition of the data, Figure 3 plots the statements by 
Chinese officials together with the RMB/USD over time. Statements by Chinese 
authorities were markedly more frequent in the aftermath of the Asian crisis, in 1997-
2000, when the debate about a possible devaluation of the renminbi mounted, between 
2004/5 (start of the exchange rate reform) and mid-2008 (start of the global financial 
crisis and de facto re-pegging of the renminbi to the US dollar), as well as since late 









This section presents the empirical results, starting with those for the unconditional 
analysis, then proceeding with the conditional analysis, and concluding with various 
extensions and robustness checks. 
 
3.1 Unconditional analysis 
 
Table 3 reports baseline estimates for the three-factor exchange rate model of 
equation (1), using a pooled OLS estimator (columns (1) to (3)) and a fixed effect 
estimator (columns (4) to (6)). We consider model specifications including only the 
factors and also including controls, namely the change in oil prices, global liquidity 
conditions (as proxied by the TED spread, i.e. the difference between short-term US 
interbank and T-bill rates) and risk (as proxied by the VIX index, a measure of 
implied volatility of S&P 500 index options).
15 We correct standard errors for 
heteroscedasticity and clustered heterogeneity. 
 
Tables 3 – 4 
 
A first key insight from Table 3 is that the US factor explains the bulk of 
global FX dynamics. The US factor loading is the largest of the three factors, at 
around 0.4 (i.e. a 1% depreciation of the US dollar vis-à-vis the SDR is associated 
with an average 0.4% depreciation of the sample’s currencies vis-à-vis the SDR). This 
reflects the US dollar’s dominant role in the international monetary system. Both the 
euro and regional factors are of a smaller magnitude, with a loading estimate of about 
0.14-0.17 (i.e. less than half that of the US factor), pointing to a more modest 
importance for exchange rate dynamics globally. Depending on the specification, 
adjusted-R
2s are in the order of 7%-11%, which is fairly satisfactory when considering 
the high data frequency. The results are also very robust across specifications and they 
are not altered when adding controls or country effects. The latter, in particular, are 
insignificant and only explain a very small share of the data’s variance (as indicated 
by the ρ-statistics reported in the bottom row of Table 3). 
 
  Another important aspect is the marked increase of the regional factor’s 
importance over time. Table 4 presents estimation results for two sub-periods: (i) 
before the start of China’s exchange rate reform in 2005 and (ii) after the start of the 
reform. Strikingly, the estimated regional factor loading more than quadruples 
between these two periods, from about 0.07 before 2005 to over 0.30 afterwards. This 
underscores the growing importance of the regional dimension in global exchange rate 
dynamics, an aspect of key importance for Asia. 
 
Table 5, Figure 4 
 
                                                 
15 Data for the control variables are taken from Bloomberg. 20
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Do the factor model estimates vary between advanced and emerging 
economies and, within emerging economies, across regions? Table 5 presents 
estimates broken down by country groups and regions. When restricting the 
estimation to advanced economies, the factors are found to be mostly insignificant (or 
barely significant in the case of the euro factor), in line with the fact that most of these 
currencies are floating.
16 Within the emerging economies, the US factor is found to be 
most important for emerging Asia, Latin America and the GCC, with loadings of 
about 0.6, 0.8 and 1, respectively, which mirrors the strong orientation of these 
regions’ currencies to the US dollar. In turn, the importance of the euro factor is 
strongest for emerging Europe, with a loading estimate of 0.3, in line with the euro’s 
important role in the region, which itself rests on strong institutional, trade and 
financial linkages between the euro area and its Central and Eastern European 
neighbours. 
 
Importantly, the regional factor is statistically significant for emerging Asia, a 
piece of evidence in line with China’s dominance hypothesis, which also implies that 
the null hypothesis H0 of Eq. (1bis) can be rejected. Emerging Asia’s regional factor is 
also by far the largest in magnitude across all regions, with an estimated loading of 
over 0.2, underscoring the strong regional orientation of exchange rate policy in the 
area, under the “East Asian dollar standard” and the “Asian production chain”. 
Moreover, the model for emerging Asia has a remarkably good fit, with an adjusted 
R
2 of over 20%, which is better only for the GCC economies (for which the model has 
perfect fit, which is due to these countries’ stringent US dollar pegs). 
 
In line with this evidence, Figure 4 shows that there is a significant degree of 
heterogeneity in regional exposures across our sample’s 48 currencies, but that the 
regional factor is especially important for emerging Asian currencies. The figure, 
which plots the distribution of the regional factor loadings estimated for all of the 
currencies, suggests that this distribution is very heterogeneous. Some currencies react 
almost one-to-one with the regional factor; others are unaffected by regional currency 
dynamics, with loadings close to zero; and a few others move in a direction 
systematically opposite to that of the currencies of their region, with a negative 
loading estimate. The estimates for the emerging Asian currencies, which are 
indicated by the red lines in the figure, confirm that the regional dimension is of key 
importance for these currencies. Arguably, China and Hong Kong have regional factor 
loadings that are virtually close to zero (due to their hard pegs to the US dollar). But 
India has a loading of about 0.1 (close to the pooled sample estimate), while that of 
Indonesia, Singapore and Taiwan are much higher (at about 0.3, i.e. over twice the 
pooled sample estimate) and that of Taiwan, Thailand; Philippines; Malaysia and 
Korea are among the highest in the sample (at about 0.5). 
 
Tables 6 – 7 
 
                                                 
16 The statistical significance of the euro factor might be due to the fact that our group of advanced 
economies also includes Sweden, Denmark and Iceland, which all manage (more or less heavily) their 
currencies vis-à-vis the euro. 21
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Considering now emerging Asia more specifically, Table 6 presents evidence 
that the regional factor has grown in economic importance over time, another piece of 
evidence consistent with China’s dominance hypothesis, which also implies that the 
null hypothesis 0 H′ of Eq.(1bis) can be rejected. The table reports regression results 
when restricting the sample to emerging Asia and for two sub-periods (before and 
after 2005). Strikingly, the regional factor loading estimate after the start of China’s 
exchange rate reform in 2005, at 0.25, is about one-third higher than that before 2005. 
This is supportive of the view that emerging Asia’s policy-makers pay more attention 
to regional currency developments as China gradually strengthens the flexibility of its 
exchange rate regime. 
 
  Table 7 presents even more direct evidence of the growing role played by the 
renminbi in the region. It reports estimates based on a slightly modified version of the 
factor model where the regional factor is replaced with a “China factor”, i.e. the 
RMB/SDR exchange rate, which we orthogonalize with respect to the US factor (and 
the euro factor) to identify renminbi movements that are not purely driven by the US 
dollar. The estimates are reported for various sub-periods: before and after 2005; prior 
to the outbreak of the global financial crisis (2005 to 2007); during the global 
financial crisis (2007 to 2008); and since the onset of the recovery in emerging Asia 
(since 2009). China is excluded from the estimations so as not to have it on both sides 
of the regression. What is conspicuous about the results is that the China factor is 
neither statistically significant over the full estimation period nor over all sub-periods 
up to the global financial crisis. But since emerging Asia started to recover in 2009, 
the China factor is both statistically significant and very important in terms of 
economic magnitude, with a loading of about 0.15, i.e. several times larger than the 
pre-crisis estimate. Again, this is supportive of the view that policy-makers and/or 
markets in emerging Asia are paying much greater attention to developments in the 
renminbi for the valuation of other regional currencies since the crisis. 
 
Although the role of the RMB factor is increasing markedly over time, it is not 
dominant in economic magnitude (while the US dollar factor is). It is worth stressing 
again, however, that the concept of a country’s dominance is a relative one, and it can 
still exist alongside that of another country that also exerts strong influence. This may 
be the case of the RMB indeed. While it may not dominate the US dollar’s impact on 






  Having established that a regional factor explains currency movements 
significantly in emerging Asia and increasingly so since China started to reform its 
exchange rate regime in 2005, we now test whether this regional factor is driven by 
the renminbi and not vice-versa. This is taken up in Table 8, which reports Granger 
                                                 
17 Also as aforementioned, it was similarly found for Europe in the 1980s that while German interest 
rate movements had the strongest effect on interest rates of all countries in the continent, US interest 
rates had also retained a significant effect. 22
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causality test results based on a bi-variate VAR for emerging Asia. The VAR includes 
2-day (non-overlapping) returns for the RMB/SDR and the regional factor (excluding 
China) and up to 3 lags. The table shows the p-value of the corresponding F-tests for 
various sub-periods.  
 
Overall, there is significant evidence that the RMB causes movements in 
Asia’s regional factor, in line with China’s dominance hypothesis since the start of 
China’s exchange rate reform in 2005. The null that it does not (i.e.  0 H ′ ′  in Eq. (1ter)) 
is rejected for the period after 2005, but not before (see upper quadrant of Table 8). 
This again suggests that it is only after China embarked on reforms that the renminbi 
gained influence on the rest of emerging Asia’s currencies. Noticeably, the null is 
most strongly rejected in post-crisis data, i.e. after the onset of the recovery in 
emerging Asia in 2009. This further confirms that the global financial crisis was a 
major turning point in strengthening the RMB’s role in the region. 
 
A further interesting finding is that the renminbi is not immune from 
influences stemming from the rest of Asia. There is evidence that causality is bi-
directional. In other words, movements in Asia’s regional factor also cause those of 
the renminbi to some extent. We cannot reject the null that they do not indeed (i.e. 
0 H ′ ′ ′  in Eq. (1ter)) either before 2005 nor after (see the lower quadrant of Table 8). We 
can only do so during the acute phase of the crisis (2007-2008), perhaps because of 
China’s de facto re-pegging to the US dollar in the middle of 2008. All in all, these 
results suggest that China’s dominance in emerging Asia remains weaker so far than 
that of Germany on Europe two or three decades ago. China’s impact on other 
emerging Asian countries’ exchange rate policy is strong and significant, but the 
region, taken together, also has an impact on China’s exchange rate policy. Strictly 




3.2 Conditional analysis 
 
The evidence on the RMB’s role in emerging Asia we have presented thus far is 
only indirect, however. To gauge more directly the impact of China’s currency in the 
region, we conduct a complementary analysis based on an event-study that exploits 
the FX market reaction to official statements on exchange rate and reserve policy 
made by Chinese authorities. As discussed above, this allows for a clean identification 
of exogenous RMB-specific shocks and to trace their effect through global foreign 
exchange markets, notably in Asia. Our hypothesis remains that if market participants 
consider such statements as credible, they can be expected to have a depreciating 
impact on the US dollar against the euro and other reserve currencies. Moreover, one 
would expect also other Asian currencies to appreciate against the US dollar, but a 
regional dominance of the RMB should imply that such an appreciation is broadly 
similar to that of the RMB itself, as policy-makers in Asia try to stabilise the 
movements of their currencies relative to that of the RMB. 
 23
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Tables 9 – 11 
 
Table 9 reports estimates for the full sample of the conditional model of 
equation (2), using a pooled OLS estimator (columns (1) to (3)) and a fixed effect 
estimator (columns (4) to (6)). There is strong evidence that RMB shocks impact 
global exchange rate configurations in line with our theoretical prior. A statement 
pointing to a relaxation of China’s peg to the US dollar or to a diversification of 
China’s reserves away from the US dollar leads to a statistically significant 
appreciation of the currencies in our sample relative to the SDR basket, i.e. including 
the US dollar, of 0.1% on average, on the day the statement occurs. This result is very 
robust across specifications and is not altered when adding controls or country effects. 
Country effects, in particular, are again insignificant, and explain an infinitesimally 
small share of the data’s variance (as indicated by the ρ-statistics). Moreover, the 
factor loadings of the three FX factors remain quasi identical to those estimated under 
the unconditional model. 
 
  The economic importance of RMB shocks for overall FX markets has 
increased somewhat over time, as shown by Table 10, which reports that the estimated 
impact of Chinese statements rises from -0.08 before 2005 to -0.11 afterwards. The 
impact of the RMB shocks yet varies appreciably in magnitude across country groups 
and regions (see Table 11). It tends to be stronger for advanced economies (with an 
estimate of about -0.14) than for EMEs (with an estimate of about -0.09), perhaps 
because of the latter’s more rigid exchange rate regimes. Within EMEs, the estimated 
impact is also stronger for emerging Europe (at about -0.15) than for Latin America or 
Asia (at about -0.11 and -0.08, respectively). The strong effect found for emerging 
European currencies might reflect the fact that they are often managed vis-à-vis the 
euro which, in line with portfolio balance models predictions, could be markedly 




Most importantly, Figure 5 shows that the responses of Asian currencies are 
more similar to that of the RMB itself than the responses of currencies of advanced 
economies or other EME regions (with the exception of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
countries, which have strict peg to the US dollar). This provides some general 
confirmation for hypothesis (2bis). However, Figure 5 also indicates that Asian 
currencies generally react stronger than the RMB itself. One interpretation is that 
statements by Chinese authorities trigger market expectations that induce strong 
appreciation pressures in other countries, while contemporaneously Chinese 
authorities are able to keep the RMB relatively more stable (which may be more 
feasible for Chinese authorities, given the non-convertibility of the RMB, than for 
policy-makers with more open FX markets). 
 
 
Robustness and extensions to the conditional analysis 
 24
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We now turn to a number of extensions and robustness tests. Focusing more 
narrowly on emerging Asia, Table 12 shows that the effect of RMB shocks on the 
region’s currencies has grown markedly in economic importance since China 
embarked on exchange rate reforms in 2005. The estimated shock impact after 2005, 




We extend the conditional analysis in various directions in order to gauge the 
robustness of the findings and also to draw out more about the economic relevance of 
the effects of the RMB. We first use the US dollar rather than the SDR basket as 
numéraire, in order to make the parameter estimates readily interpretable. Table 13 
reveals that the parameter estimates double from -0.10 before 2005 to almost -0.20 
after 2005. In other words, a statement pointing to a relaxation of China’s peg to the 
US dollar or to a diversification of China’s reserves away from the US dollar leads to 
an appreciation of emerging Asian currencies of 0.2% on average vis-à-vis the US 
dollar, on the day the statement occurs.  
 
We find a similarly strong post-2005 increase in economic magnitude when using 
forward exchange rates (non-deliverable forward contracts, NDFs), which can be 
taken as a proxy of market expectations regarding future exchange rates (see Table 
14). Considering also the evidence after 2005 in more detail, it is striking that the 
impact of RMB shocks is strongest after the start of emerging Asia’s recovery in 
2009, with an order of magnitude that is almost four times larger than before 2005 
(Table 15). 
 
Tables 13 – 15 
 
These findings give further support to the view that policy-makers in emerging 
Asia have been paying much greater attention to developments in the renminbi since 
the crisis. They are in line with the existence of both a portfolio balance channel and a 
signalling channel, in which market participants regard Chinese official statements as 
a signal that, should China decouple from the US dollar, the rest of Asia could may 
decouple too. Moreover, the results are supportive of the view that official statements 
pointing to an appreciation of the RMB against the US dollar encourage other 
emerging Asian economies to let their currencies appreciate in turn, so as to stabilise 




As a final point, Table 16 reports pooled OLS estimates of potential 
determinants of the heterogeneity in the country-specific elasticities with respect to 
RMB shocks shown in Figure 5 and Table 11. We therefore take all the betas in a 
cross-section and try to explain them by looking at four specific determinants: trade 
integration with China (i.e. both the share of exports to China in total exports and that 
of imports from China in total imports); financial integration with China (i.e. the share 25
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of portfolio investments in China in total portfolio investments); the flexibility of the 
exchange rate regime; as well as dummies for countries belonging to what we 
consider as the “dollar bloc” (emerging Asia and the GCC) and those belonging to 
what we call the “euro bloc” (emerging Europe).
18 
 
Two results are worth stressing. Higher exchange rate flexibility tends to 
increase  IO
i β ˆ  and is associated with a stronger appreciation of the exchange rate as a 
result of an RMB shock. This may apply in particular to currencies such as the euro 
and other European currencies, which have been shown above to respond strongly to 
Chinese statements on the RMB. Moreover, the anchor currency matters. The 
currencies of the countries belonging to the US dollar bloc tend to appreciate less to 
an RMB shock, while those belonging to the euro bloc tend to appreciate more, a 
result that is fairly robust across specifications. This further underscores the possible 
existence of a portfolio balance channel and a signalling channel, as well as the role 
played by market expectations of diversification of China’s reserves out of the US 
dollar into the euro, along with that of a possibly declining dominance of the US 
currency in the international monetary system. 
 
We stress that this final part of the analysis on the determinants is merely 
suggestive, as other channels and mechanisms may be at work as well. The point is 
rather to show that the cross-sectional heterogeneity in the responses to Chinese FX 
statements has an underlying economic rationale that is indeed related to the choice of 
exchange rate regimes and economic fundamentals of countries. Overall, the findings 
point not only to a rising role of the RMB in determining exchange rates of other 






This paper has presented empirical evidence consistent with China’s dominance 
hypothesis, suggesting that the international monetary system is already on the verge 
of being tri-polar, with the US dollar as global currency, and both the euro and the 
Chinese renminbi playing an important role for regional currencies. China’s exchange 
rate policy is found to already exert a strong and growing influence on other emerging 
Asian economies’ exchange rate policies since 2005, and even more so since the 
global financial crisis. 
 
However, exchange rate developments in China do not seem entirely immune 
from influences from the rest of Asia: we have also uncovered evidence of bi-
directional causality and that Asian currency movements also drive those of the 
                                                 
18 Data for trade and financial integration are taken from the IMF’s WEO and CPIS databases. 
Exchange rate regimes are classified according to Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) in line with the 2008 
updates of Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff, and with following coding: 1 = dollarisation/euroisation or 
hard peg; 2-3 = managed float; 4 = free float. The estimates of Table 16 are obtained using the SDR as 
numéraire. Quasi similar results are obtained when using the US dollar as numéraire. 26
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renminbi, albeit to a lesser extent. All in all, these results suggest that China’s 
dominance in emerging Asia remains weaker so far than that of Germany on Europe 
two or three decades ago since Germany’s monetary and exchange rate policy was 
found never to be influenced by that of other European countries at that time. 
 
Looking ahead, many open questions remain. First, we have emphasised that 
our analysis is not about all the facets of the international role of the RMB – i.e. the 
use the RMB in real or financial transactions, or in FX reserve holdings – but rather 
about its emerging role as an anchor currency, i.e. the influence of China’s FX policy 
on global FX configurations and in particular on the Asian region, akin to the debate 
about the importance of German policy for the EMS in the 1980s and 1990s. A rising 
international role of the RMB, as envisaged and currently actively pursued by Chinese 
authorities, may well increase this influence of RMB policy further in the years ahead. 
 
Another issue concerns the optimality of FX configurations in Asia and 
whether countries should focus their FX management vis-à-vis a currency from 
outside the region, such as the US dollar, is optimal or whether stronger explicit 
exchange rate coordination at the regional level might be beneficial. This is indeed 
what Europe’s experience is the 1980s and 1990s would suggest. As China continues 
to reform its exchange rate regime in the years ahead, it is well possible to that such a 
question could be of increasingly pressing policy interest, both for Asia and globally. 27
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Note: The figures show the US factor (USD/SDR) along with the euro factor (EUR/SDR) used in the 
unconditional model described in Eq. (1). An upward movement indicates depreciation relative to the SDR 
basket (euro, US dollar, pound sterling and yen). Our identification condition is that the US factor is considered 
exogenous, reflecting the US dollar’s dominant role in the international monetary system, while the euro factor 
is orthogonalized with respect to the US dollar factor. Factor levels are shown to facilitate visual interpretation, 
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*orthogonalized with respect to the US and euro factors
MENA (index level)*
 
Note: The figures show the regional factor (regional currency index/SDR) corresponding to each of our six 
regions. An upward movement indicates depreciation relative to the SDR basket. Our identification conditions 
are that the US factor and the euro factor are considered as exogenous, while the regional factor is 
orthogonalized with respect to these two factors. Factor levels are shown to facilitate visual interpretation, 
although we use in the empirical estimation 2-day (non-overlapping) returns to ensure that the variables are 
stationary. As the regional factor for country i is calculated by excluding country i itself, to make sure that it is 
not on both sides of Eq. (1), regional factors are country specific (but very highly correlated within regions). 
The factors shown here are those for Switzerland, Hong Kong, Argentina, Bahrain, Hungary and South Africa. 31
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Figure 3: RMB/USD exchange rate and official statements by Chinese policy-






























Figure 4: Distribution of regional factor loadings 
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Note: The figure shows the distribution of the regional factor loadings  REG
i β
 when estimating Eq. (1) for each of 
the 48 countries of our sample. The estimates specific to emerging Asian countries are indicated by the red lines 
(CN: China; HK: Hong Kong; IN: India; ID: Indonesia; SG: Singapore; TW: Taiwan; TH: Thailand; PH: 
Philippines; MY: Malaysia; KR: Korea). 32
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Figure 5: Impact of a Chinese official statement on global FX markets  
(breakdown by currency; SDR as numéraire currency; in %) 
China estimate







beta_IO (numéraire currency: SDR)
 
Note: The figure shows the average impact (in %) as estimated from Eq. (2) of an official statement by Chinese 
policy-makers on exchange rate/reserve allocation policy on each of our sample’s 48 currencies on the day the 
statement occurs. Estimates shown are equally-weighted averages for all currencies within a particular region or 
group. The SDR basket is used as numéraire. A negative entry indicates an appreciation of the respective currency 
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Table 1: List of the countries included in the sample 
Advanced 
economies
Emerging Asia Latin America Gulf Co-operation 
Council
Emerging Europe Middle-East and 
Northern Africa
Australia China Argentina Bahrain Bulgaria Israel
Canada Hong Kong  Brazil Oman Czech Republic Lebanon
Euro* India Chile Qatar Estonia Southafrica
Japan Indonesia Colombia Saudi Arabia Hungary Turkey 
New Zealand Korea Mexico United Arab Emirates Latvia
Norway Malaysia Peru Lithuania
Sweden Philippines Venezuela Poland
Switzerland Singapore Romania
United Kingdom Taiwan Russia





Note: The table reports the 48 countries included in our sample broken down by country group/region. The euro and the US dollar are reported 








Table 2: Pair-wise correlations across the three factors  
(prior to orthogonalization) 





Euro factor  -0.1416* 1
Regional factor (all countries) 0.1380*  0.1543* 1
Regional factor (by region)
- only advanced economies -0.1385* 0.7685* 1
- only emerging Asia 0.5186* -0.0239* 1
- only Latin America 0.2517* 0.0367* 1
- only GCC 0.7357* -0.0703* 1
- only emerging Europe 0.0174* 0.1254* 1
- only MENA 0.0462* 0.1472* 1
 
Note: (*) indicates that the correlation coefficient is significant at the 5% level of confidence.                 
The correlations are calculated using 2-day (non-overlapping) exchange rate returns. 34
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Table 3: Global exchange rate factor model – Full sample estimates 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
US factor 0.391*** 0.389*** 0.399*** 0.391*** 0.389*** 0.399***
(0.077) (0.072) (0.072) (0.077) (0.072) (0.072)
Euro factor 0.171*** 0.170*** 0.161*** 0.171*** 0.170*** 0.161***
(0.037) (0.036) (0.035) (0.037) (0.036) (0.035)
Regional factor 0.153*** 0.139*** 0.153*** 0.139***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Oil prices -0.014*** -0.014***
(0.002) (0.002)
Liquidity risk 0.110** 0.111**
(0.044) (0.044)
Risk aversion 0.037*** 0.037***
(0.007) (0.007)
Constant 0.009** 0.009** 0.010** 0.009** 0.009** 0.010***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 85,823 85,819 85,819 85,823 85,819 85,819
Adjusted R
2 0.0679 0.0915 0.108 0.0679 0.0916 0.108
ρ 0.000519 0.000567 0.000582
Fixed effects Pooled OLS
 
Note: Pooled OLS and fixed effect estimates of Eq. (1) for the full sample. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. (***), (**) and (*) denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of confidence, 
respectively. 
 
Table 4: Global exchange rate factor model – Full sample estimates 
(by time period) 
Before 2005 After 2005
(1) (2)
US factor 0.537*** 0.301***
(0.068) (0.073)
Euro factor 0.111*** 0.194***
(0.034) (0.040)
Regional factor 0.074*** 0.322***
(0.019) (0.055)
Oil prices -0.005*** -0.018***
(0.001) (0.004)
Liquidity risk 0.077 0.081*
(0.054) (0.048)








Note: Pooled OLS estimates of Eq. (1) for the full sample and for two sub-periods: (i) before the start of China’s 
exchange rate reform in 2005 and (ii) after the start of the reform. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. (***), (**) and (*) denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of confidence, 
respectively. 35
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Table 5: Global exchange rate factor model – Full sample estimates  












(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
US factor -0.018 0.523*** 0.656*** 0.779*** 0.999*** -0.070 0.493*
(0.137) (0.077) (0.078) (0.076) (0.001) (0.142) (0.203)
Euro factor 0.244* 0.122*** 0.085*** 0.087** -0.000 0.284*** 0.145
(0.114) (0.030) (0.020) (0.028) (0.001) (0.081) (0.092)
Regional factor 0.135 0.113*** 0.216** 0.165** -0.000 0.045*** 0.073*
(0.228) (0.016) (0.077) (0.053) (0.002) (0.008) (0.029)
Oil prices -0.029** -0.011*** -0.005*** -0.011* 0.000 -0.021*** -0.011
(0.009) (0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.000) (0.004) (0.007)
Liquidity risk 0.103 0.102** 0.147** 0.210* -0.003* -0.035 0.093
(0.182) (0.043) (0.060) (0.106) (0.001) (0.074) (0.267)
Risk aversion 0.037 0.039*** 0.029*** 0.054** -0.000 0.050*** 0.068
(0.023) (0.007) (0.009) (0.018) (0.000) (0.011) (0.034)
Constant -0.000 0.011** 0.013** 0.014* 0.000 0.011 0.027
(0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.000) (0.010) (0.029)
Observations 14,655 67,510 20,022 12,760 9,164 18,258 7,306
Adjusted R
2 0.0802 0.141 0.238 0.235 0.994 0.0976 0.0960 
Note: Pooled OLS estimates of Eq. (1) for each of the sample’s country groups or regions. Robust standard errors 
are reported in parentheses. (***), (**) and (*) denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of 
confidence, respectively. GCC = Gulf Co-operation Council; MENA = Middle-East and Northern Africa. 
 
 
Table 6: Global exchange rate factor model – Estimates for emerging Asia  
(by time period) 
Before 2005 After 2005
(1) (2)
US factor 0.736*** 0.598***
(0.072) (0.087)
Euro factor 0.042* 0.146***
(0.019) (0.036)
Regional factor 0.186** 0.251***
(0.077) (0.077)
Oil prices -0.003 -0.003*
(0.002) (0.002)
Liquidity risk 0.263* 0.065
(0.138) (0.045)








Note: Pooled OLS estimates of Eq. (1) restricted to emerging Asia and for two sub-periods: (i) before the start of 
China’s exchange rate reform in 2005 and (ii) after the start of the reform. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. (***), (**) and (*) denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of confidence, 
respectively. 36
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Table 7: Global exchange rate factor model – Estimates for emerging Asia 
(RMB used as regional factor) 







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
US factor 0.695*** 0.771*** 0.645*** 0.632*** 0.640*** 0.687***
(0.059) (0.051) (0.069) (0.086) (0.062) (0.063)
Euro factor 0.047** 0.001 0.120*** 0.053 0.172*** 0.150**
(0.016) (0.011) (0.034) (0.029) (0.053) (0.052)
RMB factor 0.031 0.002 0.063 0.017 0.029 0.147**
(0.036) (0.028) (0.052) (0.042) (0.089) (0.053)
Oil prices -0.006*** -0.004* -0.003* 0.001 0.003 -0.010**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Liquidity risk 0.154** 0.300* 0.039 0.303 0.037 1.282*
(0.060) (0.140) (0.047) (0.184) (0.050) (0.597)
Risk aversion 0.039*** 0.020*** 0.047*** 0.019** 0.042*** 0.058***
(0.009) (0.005) (0.012) (0.007) (0.012) (0.016)
Constant 0.011** 0.026*** -0.008 -0.021** 0.026 -0.022*
(0.004) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.019) (0.010)
Observations 18,188 10,267 7,921 2,600 2,606 2,715
Adjusted R
2 0.200 0.186 0.244 0.279 0.229 0.257
 
Note: Pooled OLS estimates of Eq. (1) restricted to emerging Asia and for various sub-periods: (i) before the start 
of China’s exchange rate reform in 2005; (ii) after the start of the reform; (iii) before the eruption of the global 
financial crisis (2005/7); (iv) during the intensification of the global financial turmoil (2007/08); (v) since the 
onset of the recovery in emerging Asia (post-2009). The RMB/SDR (orthogonal with respect to both the US and 
euro factors) is taken here as regional factor. China is excluded from the estimation so as not to have it on both 
sides of the regression. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. (***), (**) and (*) denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of confidence, respectively. 
 
 
Table 8: Granger causality test results 
123
H''0: RMB does not cause Asia's regional factor
All sample 0.001 0.026 0.058
Pre-2005 0.014 0.205 0.301
Post-2005 0.004 0.000 0.000
Pre-crisis (2005/06) 0.188 0.067 0.095
Crisis (2007/08) 0.315 0.042 0.103
Post-crisis (post-2009) 0.008 0.001 0.004
H'''0: Asia's regional factor does not cause RMB
All sample 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pre-2005 0.000 0.000 0.000
Post-2005 0.015 0.026 0.058
Pre-crisis (2005/06) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Crisis (2007/08) 0.457 0.397 0.538
Post-crisis (post-2009) 0.000 0.001 0.001
Lag order of the VAR model
 
Note: Granger causality test results based on a bi-variate VAR estimated for emerging Asia and including the 
RMB/SDR and the regional factor (excluding China), with up to 3 lags. The table shows the p-value of the 
corresponding F-tests for various sub-periods. 37
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Table 9: Conditional analysis – Full sample estimates 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Chinese statements -0.105*** -0.105*** -0.104*** -0.105*** -0.105*** -0.104***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
US factor 0.395*** 0.393*** 0.403*** 0.395*** 0.393*** 0.403***
(0.077) (0.072) (0.071) (0.077) (0.072) (0.071)
Euro factor 0.169*** 0.169*** 0.159*** 0.169*** 0.169*** 0.159***
(0.037) (0.035) (0.035) (0.037) (0.035) (0.035)
Regional factor 0.152*** 0.139*** 0.152*** 0.139***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Oil prices -0.014*** -0.014***
(0.002) (0.002)
Liquidity risk 0.114** 0.114**
(0.044) (0.044)
Risk aversion 0.037*** 0.037***
(0.007) (0.007)
Constant 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.013***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 85,823 85,819 85,819 85,823 85,819 85,819
Adjusted R
2 0.0684 0.0918 0.109 0.0685 0.0919 0.109
ρ 0.000517 0.000567 0.000609
Fixed effects Pooled OLS
 
Note: Pooled OLS and fixed effect estimates of Eq. (2) for the full sample. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. (***), (**) and (*) denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of confidence, 
respectively. 
 
Table 10: Conditional analysis – Full sample estimates 
(by time period) 
Before 2005 After 2005
(1) (2)
Chinese statements -0.082*** -0.106***
(0.018) (0.018)
US factor 0.539*** 0.305***
(0.068) (0.073)
Euro factor 0.110*** 0.192***
(0.034) (0.040)
Regional factor 0.073*** 0.321***
(0.019) (0.055)
Oil prices -0.005*** -0.018***
(0.001) (0.004)
Liquidity risk 0.076 0.084*
(0.054) (0.048)








Note: Pooled OLS estimates of Eq. (2) for the full sample and for two sub-periods: (i) before the start of China’s 
exchange rate reform in 2005 and (ii) after the start of the reform. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. (***), (**) and (*) denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of confidence, 
respectively. 38
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Table 11: Conditional analysis – Full sample estimates  












(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Chinese statements -0.144** -0.094*** -0.084*** -0.111** 0.000 -0.151*** -0.163
(0.048) (0.016) (0.025) (0.038) (0.001) (0.028) (0.071)
US factor -0.013 0.526*** 0.660*** 0.784*** 0.999*** -0.066 0.499*
(0.138) (0.077) (0.077) (0.076) (0.001) (0.141) (0.201)
Euro factor 0.242* 0.121*** 0.083*** 0.085** -0.000 0.282*** 0.142
(0.114) (0.030) (0.020) (0.028) (0.001) (0.081) (0.091)
Regional factor 0.135 0.113*** 0.215** 0.164** -0.000 0.043*** 0.072*
(0.228) (0.016) (0.077) (0.053) (0.002) (0.008) (0.028)
Oil prices -0.029** -0.011*** -0.005*** -0.011* 0.000 -0.021*** -0.011
(0.009) (0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.000) (0.004) (0.007)
Liquidity risk 0.107 0.105** 0.149** 0.214* -0.003* -0.031 0.100
(0.183) (0.043) (0.061) (0.108) (0.002) (0.074) (0.268)
Risk aversion 0.037 0.039*** 0.029*** 0.054** -0.000 0.050*** 0.069
(0.023) (0.007) (0.009) (0.018) (0.000) (0.011) (0.034)
Constant 0.004 0.014*** 0.015** 0.017** -0.000 0.015 0.031
(0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.000) (0.010) (0.030)
Observations 14,655 67,510 20,022 12,760 9,164 18,258 7,306
Adjusted R
2 0.0807 0.142 0.238 0.235 0.994 0.0984 0.0969
 
Note: Pooled OLS estimates of Eq. (2) for each of the sample’s country groups or regions. Robust standard errors 
are reported in parentheses. (***), (**) and (*) denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of 
confidence, respectively. GCC = Gulf Co-operation Council; MENA = Middle-East and Northern Africa. 
 
Table 12: Conditional analysis – Estimates for emerging Asia  
(by time period) 
Before 2005 After 2005
(1) (2)
Chinese statements -0.039* -0.092**
(0.019) (0.032)
US factor 0.738*** 0.602***
(0.072) (0.086)
Euro factor 0.041* 0.144***
(0.019) (0.035)
Regional factor 0.185** 0.249***
(0.078) (0.076)
Oil prices -0.003 -0.003*
(0.002) (0.002)
Liquidity risk 0.263* 0.068
(0.138) (0.045)








Note: Pooled OLS estimates of Eq. (2) restricted to emerging Asia and for two sub-periods: (i) before the start of 
China’s exchange rate reform in 2005 and (ii) after the start of the reform. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. (***), (**) and (*) denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of confidence, 
respectively. 39
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1392
October 2011
 
Table 13: Conditional analysis – Estimates for emerging Asia 
(US dollar as numéraire currency) 
Before 2005 After 2005
(1) (2)
Chinese statements -0.101** -0.189**
(0.042) (0.060)
Euro factor 0.124** 0.215***
(0.044) (0.063)
Regional factor 0.277** 0.348**
(0.115) (0.148)
Oil prices -0.002 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002)
Liquidity risk 0.205* 0.106*
(0.107) (0.057)








Note: Pooled OLS estimates of Eq. (2) restricted to emerging Asia prior to and post-2005 and using the US dollar 
as numéraire currency (rather than the SDR basket). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. (***), (**) 
and (*) denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of confidence, respectively. 
 
 
Table 14: Conditional analysis – Estimates for emerging Asia  
(using forward exchange rates) 
Before 2005 After 2005
(1) (2)
Chinese statements -0.038 -0.092**
(0.028) (0.030)
Euro factor 0.093** 0.126**
(0.037) (0.046)
Regional factor 0.214* 0.197**
(0.097) (0.082)
Oil prices -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Liquidity risk 0.097 0.025
(0.117) (0.050)








Note: Pooled OLS estimates of Eq. (2) restricted to emerging Asia prior to and post-2005 and using bilateral 
forward exchange rates (vs. the US dollar) rather than spot exchange rates. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. (***), (**) and (*) denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of confidence, 
respectively. 40
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Table 15: Global exchange rate factor model – Estimates for emerging Asia 
(RMB used as regional factor) 







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Chinese statements -0.071** -0.038* -0.070** 0.074* -0.046* -0.149***
(0.023) (0.020) (0.028) (0.040) (0.024) (0.041)
US factor 0.697*** 0.772*** 0.648*** 0.629*** 0.641*** 0.698***
(0.059) (0.051) (0.068) (0.087) (0.061) (0.061)
Euro factor 0.046** 0.000 0.119*** 0.054* 0.172*** 0.145**
(0.016) (0.011) (0.033) (0.029) (0.053) (0.051)
RMB factor 0.030 0.001 0.063 0.020 0.030 0.148**
(0.036) (0.028) (0.052) (0.042) (0.089) (0.053)
Oil prices -0.006*** -0.004* -0.003 0.001 0.003 -0.009**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Liquidity risk 0.158** 0.299* 0.043 0.273 0.038 1.353*
(0.061) (0.140) (0.047) (0.190) (0.050) (0.605)
Risk aversion 0.039*** 0.020*** 0.047*** 0.020** 0.042*** 0.057***
(0.009) (0.005) (0.012) (0.007) (0.012) (0.016)
Constant 0.013** 0.026*** -0.005 -0.027** 0.028 -0.015
(0.004) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.019) (0.010)
Observations 18,188 10,267 7,921 2,600 2,606 2,715
Adjusted R
2 0.200 0.186 0.245 0.281 0.229 0.262
 
Note: Pooled OLS estimates of Eq. (2) restricted to emerging Asia and for various sub-periods: (i) before the start 
of China’s exchange rate reform in 2005; (ii) after the start of the reform; (iii) before the eruption of the global 
financial crisis (2005/7); (iv) during the intensification of the global financial turmoil (2007/08); (v) since the 
onset of the recovery in emerging Asia (post-2009). The RMB/SDR (orthogonal with respect to both the US and 
euro factors) is taken here as regional factor. China is excluded from the estimation so as not to have it on both 
sides of the regression. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. (***), (**) and (*) denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of confidence, respectively. 
 
 
Table 16: Determinants of the heterogeneity in the elasticity to RMB shocks  
across countries 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Exports to China 0.250*** 0.099
(0.073) (0.067)
Imports from China 0.204*** 0.076
(0.048) (0.053)
Financial integration with China 0.384*** 0.252**
(0.066) (0.111)
Exchange rate flexibility -0.034** -0.038** -0.039** -0.020
(0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.021)
Dollar bloc dummy 0.090***
(0.027)
Euro bloc dummy -0.041 -0.063** -0.065** -0.078**
(0.033) (0.029) (0.028) (0.036)
Constant -0.130*** -0.130*** -0.148*** -0.034 -0.149*** -0.111*** -0.017 -0.015 -0.078
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.037) (0.018) (0.017) (0.045) (0.045) (0.060)
Observations 46 46 35 48 48 48 46 46 35
Adjusted R
2 0.0258 0.0142 0.0356 0.130 0.158 0.00604 0.160 0.158 0.0662
log likelihood 40.95 40.68 32.84 45.66 46.46 42.47 45.44 45.38 34.50
 
Note: The table reports pooled OLS estimates of the determinants of the heterogeneity in the country-specific 
elasticities with respect to RMB shocks (Chinese statements on exchange rate and reserve policy) shown in Figure 
5. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. (***), (**) and (*) denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% level of confidence, respectively. 
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Appendix A: Additional tables 
 
 
Table I: List of the main authors of official statements 
 
Presidents of the People's Republic of China 
 
•  Jiang Zemin: 27 March 1993 – 15 March 2003 
•  Hu Jintao: since 15 March 2003 – present 
 
List of Premiers of the People’s Republic of China 
 
•  Li Peng: 1987 – 17 March 1998 
•  Zhu Rongji: 17 March 1998 – 16 March 2003  
•  Wen Jiabao: since 16 March 2003 
 
Governor of the People’s Bank of China (PBC) 
 
•  Dai Xianglong: June 1995 – December 2002 
•  Zhou Xiaochuan: December 2002 – present 
 
Other PBC officials, Head of State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) and other 
Chinese officials (including from China Investment Corporation) 
 
•  Various relevant officials  
 
 
Table II: Selected examples of official statements 
 




Date Time Policy-maker Statement
US dollar reference is 
relaxed to appreciate
1 28/08/2005 23:48 GMT Governor Zhou                           
(People's Bank of China)
"I think it is very clear that China is introducing a new exchange rate
mechanism. It is not a one-time adjustment." 
US dollar reference is 
maintained
0 09/10/2004 03:32 GMT Prime Minister Wen Jiabao        
(China)
"We will take gradual steps towards building a flexible and resilient
exchange system."
US dollar reference is 
relaxed to depreciate
-1 08/05/1998 02:10 GMT Governor Dai                              
(People's Bank of China)
"We still have enough confidence to say we will be able to maintain a stable
currency… It goes without saying that China has to pay a certain price to
maintain a stable renminbi."
Market impact Dummy 
value
Date Time Policy-maker Statement
Diversification out of 
the US dollar
1 08/01/2002 13:32 GMT Finance Minister Xiang 
Huaicheng (China)
"China has always thought the euro important and thinks that it will some
day be on an equal footing with the U.S. dollar. It is inevitable that the euro
will become some countries' reserve currency."
Reserve composition 
is maintained
0 24/03/2005 11:52 GMT Deputy chief of SAFE Wei 
Benhua  (China)
"When managing our foreign exchange reserves, we insist on the principle of
safety, liquidity and profitability." 
Diversification into 
the US dollar
-1 05/03/2006 01:25 GMT Governor Zhou                           
(People's Bank of China)
"The forex reserves are still growing. Some people are concerned that the
amount of dollar assets in the reserves will fall. But that is not the case." 
B. Examples of statements on reserve composition
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President Premier Head of SAFE Other Chinese 
official
- 1 836 513
0 9 61 11 1 4 21 81 0
1 3 6871 958
T o t a l : 1 4 02 22 4 6 62 42 1
#  by  type:
 # by  author:
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Appendix B: Theoretical basis underlying the conditional model 
 
The theoretical basis for such a model can be found in the microstructure literature of 
FX markets, and more specifically the literature on announcement effects and asset 
prices (e.g. Andersen et al. 2003, Blinder et al. 2008). This literature commonly 
models the exchange rate in a standard asset-pricing framework, where the log 
exchange rate st is a function of the discounted value of private sector expectations 
about future fundamentals ft+i: 
 
 






t f E s Ω − = ∑
∞
=




with Ωt as the public information available at time t, and θ as the discount factor. 
Since the objective is to understand the effect of public statements by policy-makers 
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The implication is that what drives exchange rates are changes to expectations by 
market participants about relevant future fundamentals. As China’s reserve 
diversification plans and changes in its exchange rate regime may precisely be such 
fundamentals, along with our three-factor pricing model, our conditional empirical 
model can be rationalized from this simple, stylized conceptual framework as Eq. (2). 
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Appendix C: Additional charts 
 
Figure C1: China and Germany’s relative economic size: now and then  








Germany w.t. EEC (in 1990) China w.t. emerging Asia (in 2010)
(%)
 
Note: EEC = European Economic Community. Source: IMF World Economic 
Outlook and authors’ calculations. 
 
Figure C2: Germany’s role as a regional trading hub back then  
Germany's share of bilateral trade (in 1990)













Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics and authors’ calculations. 
 
Figure C3: China’s role as a regional trading hub now 
China's share of bilateral trade (in 2010)












Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics and authors’ calculations. Working PaPer SerieS
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